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Thieves, Thugs, and Neighborhood Poverty
*
 
This paper develops a model of crime analyzing how such behavior is associated with 
individual and neighborhood poverty. The model shows that even under relatively minimal 
assumptions, a connection between individual poverty and both property and violent crimes 
will arise, and moreover, “neighborhood” effects can develop, but will differ substantially in 
nature across crime types. A key implication is that greater economic segregation in a city 
should have no effect or a negative effect on property crime, but a positive effect on violent 
crime. Using IV methods, I show this implication to be consistent with the empirical evidence. 
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1 Introduction
High rates of crime and violence in poor neighborhoods have been described by numerous
scholars and journalists (Wilson, 1987; Krivo and Peterson, 1996; Kotlowitz, 1991; Patterson,
1991; Messner and Tardi⁄, 1986, to name just a few). However, the quote above from a man
residing in a high-poverty housing project in south Los Angeles emphasizes that not only is
crime a large part of life in high-poverty neighborhoods, but also that violent crimes may
often serve a quite di⁄erent purpose than basic property crime. Namely, while the motivation
for basic property crimes is generally purely monetary, becoming involved in violent crime
may have a defensive motivation as well.
While this defensive motivation for violence has long been recognized by sociologists
(Massey 1995; Anderson, 1999) and more recently by economists (Silverman, 2004), the
mechanisms through which such motivations are exacerbated by individual and neighbor-
hood poverty are less well understood. This paper attempts to explicitly model some of
the key distinctions between participation in violent crimes versus basic property crimes,
as well as the ways such participation decisions might be a⁄ected by an individual￿ s own
economic circumstances as well as the economic circumstances of his neighbors. The paper
also considers the broader implications of greater residential segregation by income on the
di⁄erent types of crime.
While there may be numerous, and possibly quite complex, paths through which poverty
and neighborhood characteristics may a⁄ect criminal behavior, the model developed here
focuses on the impact of two quite simple assumptions. The ￿rst is simply that individuals
2incur diminishing marginal utility in money. The second is with respect to how violent crimes
di⁄er from basic property crimes. Speci￿cally, when it comes to basic property crimes, I
assume that by choosing to become a thief at any given period in time, an individual will
simply have additional consumption beyond his legal income in that period. Alternatively,
when it comes to violent crimes, I assume that individuals can choose to become either a
thug (i.e. an individual who engages in violence) or a paci￿st (i.e. an individual who does not
engage in violence). This will mean that when two paci￿sts encounter one another in their
neighborhood, they pass each other without incident. On the other hand, when a paci￿st
encounters a thug, the thug will attack him and take some of his money. However, when
two thugs encounter one another, violence can still ensue but not necessarily with certainty.
More importantly though, even when violence does ensue in such encounters, I assume that
neither is able to take money from the other. In this way, choosing to be a thug can not only
serve o⁄ensive purposes, allowing thugs to take money from paci￿sts in their neighborhood,
but also be defensive in terms of ensuring ones￿own money will not be taken by other thugs
and potentially preventing an attack from occurring in the ￿rst place.
As will be shown below, the above assumptions are su¢ cient to ensure that poor indi-
viduals are more likely to become both thieves and thugs than a non-poor individuals. With
respect to becoming a thief, the intuition is quite straightforward. The diminishing marginal
utility of money assumption will mean a poor individual will value a ￿xed amount of money
above and beyond his legal income more than will a rich individual, meaning that poor
individuals will have a stronger incentive than non-poor individuals to steal, all else equal.
However, without additional assumptions, individual will be no more or less likely to
become a thief if he lives in an extremely poor neighborhood versus a richer neighborhood,
meaning no ￿neighborhood e⁄ects￿when it comes to basic property crimes. However, if it is
further assumed that the return to theft is greater when a greater fraction of one￿ s neighbors
are non-poor, neighborhood e⁄ects do arise, with individuals becoming more likely to become
thieves the smaller the fraction of their neighbors that are poor. Therefore, all else equal, this
3model suggest that the degree to which a city￿ s poor residents are residentially segregated
from the city￿ s non-poor residents will either have no e⁄ect or even a negative e⁄ect on the
city￿ s overall rate of basic property crime.
On the other hand, beyond the two basic assumptions discussed above, no further as-
sumptions are necessary for neighborhood e⁄ects to arise with respect to violent crimes, as
an individual￿ s motivation to become a violent person (i.e. a thug) depends on his beliefs
regarding the likelihood he will run into other thugs in his neighborhood, which in turn can
depend on the level of poverty in his neighborhood. In fact, the model actually shows that
the e⁄ect of neighborhood poverty on individual incentives to become a violent person gets
increasingly stronger as the neighborhood poverty rate rises, which in turn implies thatt the
more a city is segregated by poverty status, the greater will be the overall rate of violent
crime￿ the opposite of what was true with respect to basic property crimes.
The latter part of the paper then empirically examines these two key implications of
the model at the citywide level￿ namely that all else equal, greater economic segregation
should have either a negligible or negative impact on basic property crimes such as burglary,
larceny and motor vehicle theft, but should have a positive impact on interpersonal violent
crimes such as robbery and aggravated assault. Using MSA level data for the United States
from the year 2000, I ￿nd support for these implications. Moreover, these results become
substantially stronger when I use instrumental variable methods to account for the possibility
that economic segregation not only may impact crime, but crime may also impact the level
of economic segregation. In particular, after I instrument for the economic segregation
for each MSA using data on how public housing is allocated in the MSA, the fraction of
local public funds in the MSA coming from the state or Federal government, the number
of municipal governments in the MSA, and the number of larger rivers in the MSA, I ￿nd
greater economic segregation has a negative but somewhat imprecisely estimated e⁄ect on
burglary, a negligible e⁄ect on larceny and motor vehicle theft, and a positive and signi￿cant
e⁄ect on robbery and aggravated assault.
42 Related Literature
The theoretical model developed below relates to three particular streams of literature. The
￿rst is that of neighborhood e⁄ects, where individual behavior is directly a⁄ected by the char-
acteristics and/or actions of his neighbors. For example, preferences for peer conformity may
alter an individual￿ s taste for engaging in crime (Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Sheinkman,1996;
Brock and Durlauf, 2001), or an individual￿ s information about payo⁄s to crime may evolve
di⁄erently depending on the number of criminals in his neighborhood (Lochner and Heavner,
2002; Calvo-Armengol and Zenou, 2004; Calvo-Armengol, Verdier, and Zenou, 2007; Patac-
chini and Zenou, 2008). Somewhat relatedly, one individual￿ s criminal behavior may create a
positive externality for other potential criminals in that one person￿ s criminal behavior taxes
￿xed police resources, which in turn lowers the probability of detecting/arresting other crim-
inals (Ferrer, 2008). While these papers describe how ￿neighborhood e⁄ects￿ can arise given
these assumptions, where a given individual￿ s optimal behavior may be depend on which
neighborhood he lives in, the model developed below takes a step back to consider how in-
dividual and neighborhood level poverty in and of themselves can a⁄ect criminal behavior
even in absence of the types of assumptions discussed above.
The second area of research this model builds on is the literature on the relationship
between crime and segregation. In this vein, Verdier and Zenou (2004) develop a model of
labor market discrimination, crime, and racial segregation. owever, while their model can
imply a correlation between crime and neighborhood income, it does not lead to ￿neighbor-
hood e⁄ects￿per say in that the actual characteristics of the an individual￿ s neighbors do not
directly a⁄ect his own criminality. O￿ Flaherty and Sethi (2007) also model the relationship
between racial segregation and a particular type of crime￿ namely robbery. An important
contribution of this model is that criminal activity (namely robbery) and racial segregation
are simultaneously determined, with both a⁄ecting the other. Moreover, individual criminal
behavior is a⁄ected by the racial/income characteristics of his neighbors. However, a key
implication of O￿ Flaherty and Sethi￿ s model is that more segregated cities should experience
5lower robbery rates, as robbers would expect to meet more resistance to robbery attempts
when a city is more segregated. As will be shown below, this is the opposite prediction
from that generated in the model developed here, which potentially allows the models to be
distinguished empirically.
Finally, the model developed below arguably most closely relates to the work describing
how violence may play a strategic role. In particular, the sociological work of Anderson
(1999) and Massey (1995) discusses how individuals adapt t high poverty isolated neighbor-
hoods environments by becoming obsessively concerned with ￿respect￿in order to lower the
risk of their own criminal victimization, where such respect is maintained primarily through
strategic use of force. Relatedly, Jankowski￿ s (1991) argues that one of the central moti-
vations for joining a gang is often self-protection, even if by joining a gang an individual
commits to perpetrating violent acts against others. Silverman (2004) develops an explicit
model of such strategic violence. In particular, within his model, if neighbors are su¢ ciently
￿connected￿to each other and individuals do not discount their future too much, then some
individuals who would prefer not to act violently toward others actually choose to engage
in such behavior while young in order to gain a reputation as a street tough that will deter
others from attacking them in the future.
While these papers consider the strategic role of violence, they generally do not make
explicit why such behaviors are connected to an individual￿ s own income and the income
distribution in the individual￿ s neighborhood, or how the overall amount of violence may
be a⁄ected by the degree to which the poor are residentially segregated from the non-poor
in the overall community. The model below attempts to develop these connections more
formally.
63 Model of Crime, Poverty, and Neighborhood Com-
position
Consider a community made up of a large number of individuals who live for an in￿nite
number of periods, where each individual can be classi￿ed as having either low income or
high income. In the absence of committing any crime, assume low income individuals have !‘
dollars available for consumption each period, while high income individuals have !h dollars
available for consumption each period, and individuals cannot save or borrow across peri-
ods. Let individuals value consumption in any given period according the a utility function
u, where u is an increasing strictly concave function in consumption, meaning individuals
incur diminishing marginal utility in money. Finally, suppose the overall community can be
divided up into a collection of neighborhoods, where each individual lives in one and only
one neighborhood. Let ￿k denote the fraction of residents in a given neighborhood k who
have low income (i.e. are poor), and let ￿ denote the community-wide fraction of residents
who have low income.
3.1 Participation in Basic Property Crimes
First consider an individual￿ s decision to become a thief, or to engage in a property crime that
does not involve a direct confrontation with other individuals (e.g. Burglary, Larceny, Motor
Vehicle Theft). By becoming a thief, an individual i adds b units of additional consumption
above and beyond the consumption possible though consuming his legal income that period,
but also incurs a utility cost of ￿i
p: In words, ￿i
p represents each individual i￿ s disutility (or
possibly his utility if ￿i
p < 0) associated with being a thief, such guilt or pleasure, as well as
the expected disutility associated with the possibility of receiving a jail sentence. In order
to focus only on the role income, assume that ￿i
p is an i.i.d. random draw from a normal
distribution with mean ￿p and variance ￿2
p,1 and therefore is independent across individuals,
1The assumption that ￿i is distributed normally is used for simplicity only. Proposition 3 and Proposition
4 employ this assumption, but both will generally hold under most any bell-shaped distributional assumption
7meaning individual￿ s preferences are not in￿ uenced directly by their neighbors￿preferences or
characteristics. This parameter will be referred to as each individual￿ s ￿criminal propensity,￿
with a lower ￿i
p indicating a higher criminal propensity.
Given the discussion from above, an individual chooses to become a thief if and only if
u(!i + b) ￿ ￿i
p ￿ u(!i), meaning the equilibrium fraction of individuals of income level !j




j = ￿p(u(!j + b) ￿ u(!j)); (1)
where ￿p is the cumulative distribution for the normally distributed random variable ￿i
p:
Because of the strict concavity of the u function, it is straightforward to see that ￿￿
h < ￿￿
‘.
In words, because the utility associated with any ￿xed monetary payo⁄ from stealing is
lower for high income individuals, high income individuals are less likely to become thieves.
Hence, the greater the overall fraction of a neighborhood who are of low income, the greater
the fraction of the neighborhood who become thieves. This argument also holds at the
community-wide level. Therefore, in this simple model, the rate of basic property crimes
committed in a neighborhood (or a whole community), should be increasing in the fraction
of neighborhood (community) made up of poor individuals. A second thing to notice about
￿￿
j as given in equation (1) is that it does not depend on ￿k. In words, the probability that
an individual becomes a thief does not depend on the income of his neighbors, meaning there
are no ￿neighborhood e⁄ects￿with respect to basic property crimes without making further
assumptions. Therefore, after controlling for the overall fraction of the community made up
of poor individuals, the level of economic segregation in the community as a whole should
have no direct e⁄ect on the overall rate of basic property crimes.
One reasonable extension is to assume that the monetary bene￿t to being a thief is greater
when fewer of one￿ s neighbors are poor, or if the monetary bene￿t to being a thief is given
for ￿i.
8by b(￿k), then b0(￿k) < 0: In this case, equation (1) would become
￿
￿
j(￿k) = ￿p(u(!j + b(￿k)) ￿ u(!j)):
Since b(￿k) is decreasing in ￿k, the above equation implies that the fraction of individuals of
any given income level j who choose to become thieves is decreasing in ￿k. Therefore, when
the monetary bene￿t to being a thief depends on the economic status of one￿ s neighbors,
there will exist neighborhood e⁄ects with respect to becoming a thief. Moreover, note that
the change in expected criminality from moving an individual of income level !j from a




j = ￿p(u(!j + b(￿k)) ￿ u(!j)) ￿ ￿p(u(!j + b(￿k0)) ￿ u(!j)):
Further note that the concavity of the u function implies [u(!j + b(￿k)) ￿ u(!j)] ￿ [u(!j +
b(￿k0)) ￿ u(!j)] will be larger when !j = !‘ than when !j = !h. Therefore, a su¢ cient
condition for ￿￿￿
‘ > ￿￿￿
h is for ￿ to be weakly convex when evaluated at or before u(!‘ +
b(￿k))￿u(!‘). Given ￿p is the cdf of a normal distribution, this would be true for example
if ￿￿
‘(0) ￿ 0:5, or if less than half of the poor individuals would choose to become thieves
even if they were the only poor person in their neighborhood.
Recalling that ￿￿￿
j denotes the expected change in criminality with respect to basic
property crimes from moving an individual of income level !j from a richer to a poorer
neighborhood, we can infer that an important implication of ￿￿￿
‘ being greater than ￿￿￿
h
is that there will be bigger increase in expected criminality when moving a poor individual
from a poorer neighborhood to a richer neighborhood than would be o⁄set by the decrease
in expected criminality from moving a rich individual from the richer neighborhood to the
poorer neighborhood. This in turn implies that when the monetary bene￿t to committing
a given basic property crime is inversely related to the fraction of the neighborhood that is
9poor, less segregation will actually increase this type of basic property crime and vice versa.
In summary, the simple model laid out in this section shows that in the absence of assum-
ing preferences, information regarding payo⁄s to crime, or policing depend on the behavior
or characteristics of one￿ s neighbors, greater segregation by income will either have no e⁄ect,
or a negative e⁄ect on community-wide basic property crimes, depending on whether the
monetary bene￿t of basic property crime becomes greater the neighborhood poverty rate
decreases.
3.2 Participation in Interpersonal Violent Crime
Now consider crimes against persons, such as muggings, robberies, and assaults. In mod-
elling these crimes, assume each individual decides whether to be a ￿thug￿or a ￿paci￿st,￿
then proceeds to encounter other individuals in his neighborhood at a rate of one person
per period. By choosing to be a paci￿st, an individual commits to acting passively when
encountering anyone in his neighborhood. Alternatively, by choosing to be a thug, an in-
dividual commits to violently attacking any paci￿st he encounters in his neighborhood and
having a violent interaction with another thug with probability p 2 [0;1]. Therefore, when
a paci￿st and a thug encounter each other, the one-sided violence will allow the thug to
successfully rob the paci￿st, thereby increasing the thug￿ s consumption in that period by b;
while decreasing the paci￿st￿ s consumption that period by b and further imposing a cost of
c on the paci￿st due to pain and su⁄ering.2 On the other hand, when two thugs encounter
each other violence arises with probability p, and when it does, both individuals will still
incur a cost of c due to pain and su⁄ering but no money will change hands. Finally, when
two paci￿sts encounter each other, no violence takes place, meaning no money changes hands
and no pain and su⁄ering arises.
2I assume that b does not depend on the income of one￿ s victim. While the model is robust to loosening
this assumption a little bit, I feel that such an assumption is generally justi￿ed. Afterall, it is not clear that
poor individuals carry less cash on them than do rich individuals, especially since poor individuals are less
likely to store their wealth in bank accounts or credit cards. A similar assumption and justi￿cation is made
by O￿ Flaherty and Sethi (2007).
10The above assumptions can be motivated two ways. First, choosing to be a thug can
be interpreted as an individual learning the ￿ghting skills and/or obtaining the weapons
necessary to take possessions from paci￿sts, who do not have such skills and/or weapons.
However, since other thugs also have ￿ghting skills and/or weapons, thugs cannot take
possessions from each other, but will incur substantial pain and su⁄ering when they ￿ght. A
second, complementary interpretation is that choosing to be a thug is equivalent to joining a
street gang, where gang members take property from the non-gang members they encounters
in their neighborhood, while at the same time must periodically engage in violence when
encountering rival gang members, but does not lose their own property in such altercations.
Such motivation is consistent with some of the ethnographic literature on gangs. For example,
in summarizing the work of Savitz, Rosen, and Lalli (1980), Spergel (1990) states ￿(j)oining
a gang may also result from rational calculations to achieve personal security, particularly
for males, in certain neighborhoods.￿
Finally, analogous to the basic property crime model, by choosing to be a thug an indi-
vidual i must further incur a utility cost ￿i
v each period, where once again ￿i
v is drawn from an
normal distribution with mean ￿v and variance ￿2
v and is independent across individuals (but
is ￿xed for a given individual across periods). As before, this criminal propensity parameter
￿i
v captures the e⁄ort and any feelings of guilt (or pleasure) associated with being a thug and
engaging in violence, as well as the expected disutility of being arrested and punished for
being a thug.
The above assumptions mean that the expected utility for any given period for an in-
dividual i of income level !j living in neighborhood k associated with becoming a thug is
given by
^ ￿k[u(!j) ￿ pc] + (1 ￿ ^ ￿k)u(!j + b) ￿ ￿
i
v;
where ^ ￿k is the individual￿ s beliefs concerning the likelihood he encounters a thug as opposed
to a paci￿st in his neighborhood in the period. Alternatively, the expected utility from being
11a paci￿st for any given period for an individual i of income level !j living in neighborhood
k is given by
^ ￿k[u(!j ￿ b) ￿ c] + (1 ￿ ^ ￿k)u(!j);
where, once again, ^ ￿k is the individual￿ s beliefs concerning the relative frequency he will
encounter a thugs as opposed to paci￿sts in his neighborhood k.
Given the above expected utilities, we can derive that optimal behavior for an individual
i of income level j living in neighborhood k is to become a thug if and only if
^ ￿k[u(!j) ￿ u(!j ￿ b) + (1 ￿ p)c] + (1 ￿ ^ ￿k)[u(!j + b) ￿ u(!j)] ￿ ￿
i
v: (2)
Like with basic property crimes, the above expression indicates that it will generally be those
with a low ￿i
v, meaning those with high criminal propensities, who will choose to become
thugs.
In order to further simplify equation (2), de￿ne ￿t(!j) to equal u(!j)￿u(!j￿b). In words,
￿t(!j) + (1 ￿ p)c is the opportunity cost incurred by not being a thug when encountering a
thug, for an individual with income !j. Similarly, de￿ne ￿p(wj) to equal u(!j + b) ￿ u(!j),
meaning ￿p(!j) is the opportunity cost incurred by not being a thug when encountering a
paci￿st, for an individual with income !j.
Given these de￿nitions, equation (2) becomes
^ ￿k(￿t(!j) + (1 ￿ p)c) + [1 ￿ ^ ￿k]￿p(!j) ￿ ￿
i
v: (3)
This equation highlights the important components with respect to the decision individuals
make regarding whether or not to become a thug in this environment. Namely, the fraction
of individuals in a neighborhood choosing to become thugs is increasing in both the monetary
bene￿t that can be obtained from doing so (i.e. ￿p(!j)), as well as the monetary and pain
and su⁄ering cost that can be avoided by doing so (i.e. ￿t(!j)+(1￿p)c). This latter bene￿t
12to being a thug is one thing that makes the decision to become a thug di⁄erent from the
decision to become a thief. Moreover, also unlike the decision regarding whether or not to
become a thief, the decision to become a thug depends on the individual￿ s beliefs regarding
the fraction of other individuals in the neighborhood who are going to be thugs (i.e. ^ ￿k).
From equation (3), we can now derive the fraction of individuals of income level !j living
in neighborhood k choosing to be a thug to be
￿j = ￿v(^ ￿k(￿t(!j) + (1 ￿ p)c) + [1 ￿ ^ ￿k]￿p(!j)); (4)
where ￿v again denotes the cdf of a normal distribution. For simplicity, I will refer to the
fraction of individuals of a given group who choose to be a thug as the violent criminal
participation rate for this group.
A Rational Expectations Equilibrium in this environment will be for individuals to be-
have optimally with respect to becoming a thug given their beliefs, and for their beliefs to
be consistent with the resulting state of the world given each other individual behaves op-
timally. If we de￿ne ￿￿
j(￿k) as the equilibrium criminal participation rate for individuals of
income level j living in a neighborhood k, we can state the following Theorem.
Theorem 1 For any ￿k 2 [0;1], there exists a Rational Expectations Equilibrium charac-
terized by violent criminal participation rates f￿￿
‘(￿k);￿￿
h(￿k)g and beliefs ^ ￿k = ￿￿(￿k) =
￿k￿￿
‘(￿k) + (1 ￿ ￿k)￿￿









￿(￿k)(￿t(!h) + (1 ￿ p)c) + [1 ￿ ￿
￿(￿k)]￿p(!h));
Proof. In Proofs Appendix (available upon request).
13Given the existence of an equilibrium,3 a ￿rst thing to note is that the strict concavity
of the u function implies that (￿t(!‘) + (1 ￿ p)c) > (￿t(!h) + (1 ￿ p)c) (or equivalently
￿t(!‘) > (￿t(!h)), and ￿p(!‘) > ￿p(!h).4 In words, low income individuals will have a
greater incentive to become thugs than will higher income individuals all else equal. The
intuition is similar to that with respect to basic property crimes. Since each individual￿ s
utility function exhibits diminishing marginal utility in consumption (and therefore income),
the greater the individual￿ s income each period, the smaller is the utility lost from getting
a relatively small amount of money taken from them in any given period, and the smaller is
the utility gained by taking a relatively small amount of money from someone else.
These di⁄ering incentive across income types leads to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 In any neighborhood k, a greater fraction of low income individuals will




Proof. In Proofs Appendix (available upon request).
The next thing to examine is how the likelihood of becoming a thug depends on the
poverty rate of one￿ s neighbors (i.e. ￿k), which leads to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 Given there is su¢ cient variation in violent criminal propensity over the
population (namely ￿v >
￿t(!‘)￿￿p(!‘) p
2￿ ), then for both high and low income individuals, the
fraction choosing to participate in interpersonal violent crimes is increasing in the fraction
of their neighborhood that has low income, or
@￿￿
j(￿k)
@￿k > 0 for j = h;‘.
3Without further assumptions, I cannot rule out the potential existence of multiple equilibria. However,
as can be con￿med in the proofs to the the Propositions below, the Propositions will apply to any potential
equilibrium.
4Technically, this result is only guaranteed when !h ￿ b > !‘ + b. In other words, when the changes
in wealth associated with mugging or being mugged are small compared to the overall income di⁄erences
between high income and low income individuals.
14Proof. In Proofs Appendix (available upon request).
Proposition 2 shows that, in this model, an individual with income level j is more likely
to become a thug if he lives in a relatively poor neighborhood than in a relatively rich neigh-
borhood, meaning there exist neighborhood e⁄ects with respect to violent crime. Intuitively,
when an individual expects a relatively high fraction of his neighbors to be thugs (as he
would in a high poverty neighborhood), his own incentive to become a thug is primarily
defensive, in the sense of being able to prevent other thugs from taking his property. Alter-
natively, when an individual expects very few of his neighbors to be thugs (as he would in
a low poverty neighborhood), his own incentive to become a thug is primarily to o⁄ensive,
in the sense of being able to successfully take property from others. Due to the diminishing
marginal utility of consumption, we know ￿t(!j)+(1￿p)c > ￿p(!j) for j = h;‘ and p 2 [0;1]
(as can also be seen in Figure 1), meaning the defensive incentive for becoming a thug in a
poor neighborhood is greater than the o⁄ensive incentive in a richer neighborhood.




@￿k ) di⁄ers by the income level of the individual. This leads to
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 If ￿￿
‘(1) ￿ 0:5, the neighborhood e⁄ect will be stronger for low income indi-







Proof. In Proofs Appendix (available upon request).
Intuitively, from Figure 1, we know that regardless of income level, the opportunity cost
associated with not being a thug when encountering a paci￿st is greater than the opportunity
cost of not being a thug when encountering another thug. This di⁄erence in opportunity
costs accounts for the greater likelihood of becoming a thug in high poverty neighborhoods
(where the likelihood of encountering a thug is high) than in lower poverty neighborhoods.
15Moreover, the strict concavity of the u function implies that this di⁄erence in opportunity
costs is greater for low-income individuals than high-income individuals (as can also be seen in
Figure 1). Thus, low-income individuals will be more in￿ uenced by the income characteristics
of their neighbors than will higher-income individuals when it comes to committing violent
crimes.5
We can now analyze how the income distribution within a neighborhood, as well as
how income is distributed across neighborhoods within the overall community, a⁄ect the
rate of interpersonal violent crime. To start this analysis, ￿rst recall that the equilibrium
fraction of individuals in any particular neighborhood k choosing to become thugs is given by
￿￿(￿k) = ￿k￿￿
‘(￿k)+(1￿￿k)￿￿

















From Proposition 1 we know that the ￿rst expression in parentheses in the above equation
is positive, and from Proposition 2 we know that the second and third expressions in the
above expression are also positive. Therefore, if we assume the overall rate of interpersonal
violent crime within a neighborhood at any given point time is a strictly increasing function of
the fraction of the residents in the neighborhood who are thugs at that time, then increasing
the fraction of the neighborhood made up of low income individuals will increase the overall
rate of interpersonal violent crime in the neighborhood.
Furthermore, note that if we take the second derivative of ￿￿(￿k) and re-arrange, we
obtain
5The su¢ cient condition for this result, namely ￿￿
‘(1) ￿ 0:5; essentially says that this result will always
hold if a relatively large fraction of poor individuals incur su¢ cient disutility from choosing to engage in
the thug life such that they will still choose not to become thugs even if all of their neighbors are poor
(i.e. a large fraction of individuals have a low criminal propensity or high ￿i
v). It is worth noting that this
is a su¢ cient condition for Proposition 3 to hold, but is not necessary. If we drop the assumption that ￿i
is normally distributed, a su¢ cient condition for Proposition 4 is that the cumulative distribution of ￿i is





























From Proposition 3, we know the expression in parentheses in the above equation is positive.
Moreover, as long as we again assume ￿￿
‘(1) ￿ 0:5 and ￿v >
￿t(!‘)￿￿p(!‘) p
2￿ , both of the latter
two terms in the above expression are also positive, implying
@2￿￿(￿k)
@￿2
k > 0.6 This leads to
Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 The rate of interpersonal violent crime in the community as a whole is
increasing in the degree to which its neighborhoods are segregated by income.
Proof. Given
@￿￿(￿k)
@￿k > 0 and
@2￿￿(￿k)
@￿2
k > 0, we know the fraction of a neighborhood that
chooses to become thugs is an increasing strictly convex function of the fraction of the
neighborhood that is poor. Therefore, for any given community wide fraction poor ￿, the
interpersonal crime rate in the overall community is minimized when all neighborhoods have
the same fraction of the poor. Alternatively, the rate of interpersonal crime in the community
as a whole becomes greater the more its neighborhoods are segregated by income.
The intuition for Proposition 4 comes from Proposition 3, which showed that neighbor-
hood e⁄ect more strongly in￿ uences poor individuals than rich individuals. Therefore, the
rate of interpersonal violent crime should necessarily be higher the more poor individuals
are segregated from richer individuals all else equal. Note that just the opposite was true
with respect to the basic property crime model developed above.
In summary, this model reveals the important role of poverty at both the individual and
neighborhood level can play when it comes to crime rates. The model shows how even with
very few assumptions, the strategic role of violence can interact with neighborhood poverty
rates to create neighborhood e⁄ects on individual decisionmaking. Notably, a key feature
of this model is that it implies that neighborhood e⁄ects with respect to violent crime are
likely to be more pronounced and di⁄erent in nature than any that might arise with respect
6Proof in Proofs Appendix which is available from the author upon request.
17to basic property crime. This is in contrast to the other models of neighborhood e⁄ects
highlighted at the beginning of Section 2, where the neighborhood e⁄ects that arise in those
models would not necessarily di⁄er across crime types.
4 Empirically Evaluating the Model
While the model presented above was in many ways quite simplistic, abstracting from many
other potentially important determinants of crime rates in cities, there is still value in at-
tempting some empirical analysis of the propositions of the model. While it would be
optimal to empirically evaluate all of these propositions, there are a variety of hurdles one
must face in attempting to do so. These hurdles are highest with respect to testing the
individual-level propositions 1 - 3. Mostly notably, there are severe data constraints as one
would need individual level data regarding criminal participation distinguished by crime type
and frequency, own legal income, as well as information regarding the income characteristics
of each individual￿ s neighbors. A reasonably large and representative dataset containing such
data is not readily available to my knowledge.
Given these data constraints, I will focus on the key community-level implications inher-
ent in Section 3.2 and Proposition 4, or that, all else equal, greater economic segregation
in a city should lead to higher rates of violent interpersonal crimes but have negligible or
even a negative impact on basic property crime rates. These community-level implications
do not face the same data constraints as the individual-level implications since information
on criminal activity by crime type, as well as measures of economic segregation (as well as a
host of other community-level characteristics) are readily available by MSA. However, there
still exists a potentially important endogeneity/simultaneity concern that was not explicitly
incorporated into the theoretical model. Namely, while the degree to which a city is seg-
regated by poverty status may have an impact on di⁄erent types of crime for the reasons
speci￿ed in the model, it may also be true that greater criminal activity a⁄ects the level
18of segregation by poverty status in overall community. Therefore, given the model treated
the level of segregation in a community as exogenous, I will attempt to focus on plausibly
exogenous variation in segregation across cities using instrumental variable methods.
As alluded to in the previous paragraph, the analysis that follows will be done at the
MSA/PMSA level (￿MSAs￿from here on). The data and varibles I use for this analysis are
described below.
FBI Uniform Crime Reports (UCR)
The FBI Uniform Crime Reporting Program is a nationwide program covering roughly
94 percent of the total U.S. population, and 96 percent of the population living in MSAs.
(Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000).7 In this analysis, I use the 2000 FBI UCR data
to look at separately at the ￿ve most common Index crimes￿ robbery, aggravated assault,
burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft.8 A major distinction between these crime
categories is that Aggravated Assault and Robbery are de￿ned to be violent crimes involving
a direct confrontation with the victim, while Burglary, Larceny, and Motor Vehicle Thefts are
de￿ned as non-violent property crimes that explicitly do not involve a direct confrontation
with the victim (Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2000).9 Therefore, I will refer to Aggravated
Assault and Robbery as ￿violent interpersonal crimes,￿and Burglary, Larceny, and Motor
Vehicle Thefts as ￿basic property crimes.￿
I also use the FBI UCR data from 1999 to measure the number of o¢ cers per 1000
residents in each city, to account for di⁄erences in police presence across cities. Moreover,
since the FBI UCR crime data are reported at the county level, I determined crime rates
and o¢ cer rates for each MSA by aggregating all relevant data for counties that fall within
a particular MSA. Because most counties either fall in one MSA or fall in zero MSAs, this
7This data was made available through the National Archive for Criminal Justice Data (NACJD) and
the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) study #3451.
8I do not look at the two other Index crimes￿ rape and murder￿ because the number of these crimes
are relatively small, especially in smaller cities, making the rates somewhat uninformative. In particular, in
many smaller cities there are less than 5 of such crimes reported in a given year, meaning for example that
one more murder in a given year will increase the murder rate in that city by 20 percent or more.
9Car-jacking, or taking an individual￿ s car by threat or force, is counted as robbery, not a motor vehicle
theft.
19generally provided accurate MSA crime information. However, several New England counties
are divided between two or more distinct MSAs. Since I could not determine which MSA
to assign the reported crimes in these counties to, I had to exclude these New England
MSAs that contained shared counties from the analysis.10 Finally, I dropped all MSAs with
fewer than 150,000 residents since their crime rates, especially for violent crime, ￿ uctuate
substantially from year to year even though there are relatively modest changes in the number
of crimes.
MSA Population Characteristics
Data regarding MSA population characteristics come for the most part from the 2000
United States Census Summary File 3. I use these data to obtain measures of a variety of
demographic chracteristics for each MSA (see Table I for particular variables). I also use
data from the Department of Housing and Urban Development￿ s ￿A Picture of Subsidized
Households - 1998￿to determine the fraction of households in each MSA that receive housing
assistance. Finally, to control for the potential e⁄ects of weather on criminal activity (see
Jacob, Lefgren, and Moretti, 2007), I determined the average number of very hot days (i.e.
temperature of 90 degrees or higher) per 100 days for each state, as well as the average
number of very cold days (i.e. temperature of 32 degrees or lower) per 100 days for each
state using data from the National Climatic Data Center.
Table I summarizes all of the above variables for the sample used in this analysis.
4.1 The Correlation between Economic Segregation and Crime
While there exist several plausible ways to measure the level of income segregation within
a city, I primarily employ what the isolation index.11 This index attempts to measure
10This criteria excluded the following MSAs: Bangor ME, Boston MA-NH, Burlington VT, Hartford
CT, Lewiston-Auburn ME, Manchester NH, Pitts￿eld MA, Portland ME, Portsmouth-Rochester NH-ME,
Spring￿eld MA. The Miami FL MSA, the Bloomington-Normal IL MSA, and the Champaign-Urbana IL
MSA were also dropped from the sample because the FBI UCR reports did not provide crime data for these
MSAs in 2000.
11All segregation measures used in this paper were computed using the Census Summary File 3 data
discussed previously.
20the extent to which individuals of one group are only exposed to one another, rather than
members of the other group, in their neighborhoods (Massey and Denton 1988). In the
context of segregation by poverty status, this index is essentially computed to be the fraction
poor in the census tract occupied by the average poor individual in that MSA, and is given
by the following formula:








where i denotes census tract. The higher this index is, the greater the level of segregation.
Looking at this segregation statistic when it is computed using all census tracts in each
MSA reveals a potentially problematic issue, namely that among the twenty MSAs with the
highest Poverty Isolation Index are College Station TX, Gainsville FL, Athens GA, Talahas-
see FL, Lafayette IN, Madison WI, Provo-Orem UT, and Las Cruces NM; all moderate to
small MSAs containing large universities. The concern this raises is that full-time students
who do not live in dormitories will generally be counted as poor, since they earn little or no
income while in school. Moreover, such students tend to live almost exclusively in census
tracts surrounding their University, causing MSAs with relatively high college student pop-
ulations to appear relatively segregated by poverty status, but not in the way we generally
are attempting to capture. Therefore, I also computed the Poverty Isolation Index for each
MSA excluding those census tracts containing over 60 percent students. This will be the
preferred measure of Poverty Segregation, however, as I will also show, results do not di⁄er
substantively by using Poverty Isolation Indices computed using all census tracts.
We can begin by looking at the relationship between crime and poverty segregation by
using simple OLS speci￿cations, regressing the MSA crime rate, for each type of crime sepa-
rately, on the Poverty Isolation Index for the MSA and a variety of other MSA characteristics.
Table II shows separate speci￿cations for each type of crime, where the dependant variable
is the rate of that crime per 100,000 residents, standardized to have a mean of zero and
standard deviation of one. I use these standardized rates in order to facilitate comparing
21magnitudes across crimes, as the overall rates per 100,000 residents di⁄er dramatically across
crimes (as can be seen in Table I).
Looking at the ￿rst row of Table II, we can see that conditional on the MSA level
characteristics, the correlation between segregation by poverty status and crime rates is
relatively weak across all crime categories, but there is some evidence that segregation by
poverty status is positively correlated with motor vehicle theft, robbery, and aggravated
assault.12
While these OLS results reveal some small di⁄erences in the correlation between poverty
segregation and crime across di⁄erent types of crime, these results are not necessarily very
informative about the degree to which such economic segregation actually a⁄ects MSA-wide
crime rates for these di⁄erent types of crimes. In particular, as alluded to previously, the
level of segregation in an MSA may be endogenous since people generally have substantial
choice about where to live within a city and crime rates might a⁄ect this decision.
Such selection may bias the causal interpretation of the OLS results for several reasons.
To take one example, Cullen and Levitt (1999) argue that rising crime rates may lead
to ￿ ight from central cities, especially by the wealthy (and white). This means that any
positive relationship between crime and segregation may arise not because greater segregation
increases crime, but because greater crime leads to greater economic and racial segregation.
Therefore, the OLS results presented previously may be upwardly biased.
Alternatively, as violent crime increases in a city, for example as gangs become more
prominent, individuals living in the neighborhoods where these gangs operate have a greater
incentive to take on the expenses associated with moving. Indeed, escaping from gangs and
12I also constructed Racial Isolation Indices for each MSA (using all census tracts). The coe¢ cients on
the Racial Isolation Index in speci￿cations otherwise ananlogous to those in Table II are insigni￿cantly
di⁄erent from zero at any standard level of signi￿cance in the Burglary, Larceny, and Motor Vehicle Theft
speci￿cations. However, the coe¢ cients on the Racial Isolation Index are positive and signi￿cant at the 1
percent level in the Robbery and Aggravated Assault speci￿cations. Like the coe¢ cients in Table II, these
coe¢ cients were also relatively small in magnitude, with the coe¢ cients indicating that a one standard
deviation in the Racial Isolation Index is correlated with a 0.25 and 0.31 standard deviation increase in
Robbery and Aggravated Assault rates respectively￿ ￿ndings consistent with Shihadeh and Flynn (1996).
The estimated coe¢ cients on the other variables are almost identical to those in Table II.
22crime was the primary reason participants in the MTO housing relocation program gave for
signing up for the program (Kling, Ludwig, and Katz, 2005). Given that these neighborhoods
where violence and gang activity are greatest are often the poorest neighborhoods in a city,
those emigrating from these neighborhoods will generally be poorer than the residents of the
neighborhoods they move to. Therefore, it is also possible that as crime increases, a city
becomes somewhat less economically segregated than it would be otherwise, meaning the
OLS results discussed previously could also be downwardly biased.13
4.2 Controlling for the Potential Endogeneity of Segregation
To overcome the potential simultaneity bias we must ￿nd some characteristics that vary
across Metropolitan areas that a⁄ect current income segregation, but can be credibly ex-
cluded from having any direct relationship to current levels of criminal activity. Given the
existence of such variables, we can then use them as instruments in Two-stage Least Squares
(2SLS) approach.14
The ￿rst instrument for segregation by poverty status that I employ is the fraction of
public housing assistance that was allocated in the form of apartments in government owned
public housing structures as opposed to allocated via Section 8 housing vouchers or certi￿-
cates (or other types of subsidies to non-government property owners). The data used to
create this instrument once again comes from the HUD￿ s ￿A Picture of Subsidized House-
holds - 1998￿described above. By design, public housing structures group poor individuals
together to a greater extent than do housing vouchers which can generally be used anywhere
in the city. Indeed, the HUD data shows that the census tracts surrounding Public Housing
Structures are almost 40 percent poor on average, compared with an average of around 20
percent poor for census tracts surrounding those units procured via vouchers or certi￿cates.
13For more formal and detailed discussions of racial and economic segregation that are not related to
crime, see Sethi and Somanathan (2004) and Bayer, McMillan, and Rueben (2004).
14Optimally, one might want to look at the relationship between changes in economic segregation over
time and changes in crime rates. However, such a method would not allevaite the basic endogeneity concern
on its own, and therefore would require time-varying instruments for economic segregation. As will be seen
below, the instruments used here are not time varying.
23Moreover, since public housing projects constitute a stock of facilities that generally have
existed for a considerable number of years prior to the year 1998 (the year in which the
measures come from for this analysis), it is unlikely that the overall fraction of housing
assistance provided via apartments in public housing projects in 1998 was directly related to
the factors determining the crime conditions in the MSA in the period around 2000, especially
after controlling for a variety of other MSA characteristics (including the overall fraction of
households receiving housing subsidies of either form in each MSA). Indeed, data from ￿A
Picture of Subsidized Housing in the 1970s￿(also made available by HUD) con￿rms that the
number of in-kind public housing units used to provide housing assistance throughout U.S.
cities in 1998 was essentially determined several decades ago. Speci￿cally, over 87 percent
of the public housing projects that existed in 1977 still existed and were in use in 1998.
Moreover, very few public housing projects were built between the 1970s and 1998, with 62
percent of all public housing projects that existed and were in use in 1998 being constructed
prior to 1977, and over 92 percent of those projects larger than 200 units being constructed
prior to 1977. Overall, this evidence reveals that most of the current use of public housing
project units was determined by decisions made in the 1970s or before, well prior to the large
increases in crime that occurred in the 1980s or any of the decreases in crime that took place
over the 1990s.
The second variable I use as an instrument for segregation by poverty status was ￿rst
used by Cutler and Glaeser (1997) as an instrument for racial segregation￿ namely the share
of local government revenue in an MSA that comes from the state or federal government in
1962.15 With more money coming from outside sources, there is less of an incentive for
individuals within a city to segregate by income, since a smaller fraction of local public
goods are funded through local taxes. Therefore, a greater fraction of local revenue coming
from the state or federal government should lead to less economic segregation in an MSA.16
15This data comes from the Census of Governments 1962, made available by the Inter-University Consor-
tium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) website.
16Note that while Cutler and Glaeser (1997) motivate this instrument identically to here, they use theirs to
instrument for racial segregation, under the further motivation that income and race are strongly correlated
24The ￿rst column of numbers in Table III shows the results of the ￿rst stage regression
of the Poverty Isolation Index calculated using all census tracts on the two instruments
meeting the exclusion restriction and the other MSA characteristics included in the original
regressions from Table II. The second column of numbers in Table III shows the analogous
results that arise when using the Poverty Isolation Index calculated using only census tracts
made up of less than 60 percent students. As can be seen, the two instruments discussed
above are signi￿cantly related to Poverty Isolation Index (using either calculation method) in
the predicted manner. However, as should be expected, both the magnitude of the estimated
coe¢ cients on the excluded instruments, as well as the F-statistic for the joint signi￿cance
of the two instruments, are larger when using the Poverty Isolation Index calculated using
only census tracts made up of less than 60 percent students.17 Therefore, I will again focus
on the results using this construction of the Poverty Isolation Index.
Table IV shows the results from the 2SLS speci￿cations. The ￿rst column in Table IV
reveals that, if anything, greater segregation by poverty status actually decreases rates of
burglary. While not statistically signi￿cant at standard levels of signi￿cance (p-value 0.117),
the coe¢ cient is relatively large in magnitude, suggesting that a one standard deviation
increase in the Poverty Isolation Index leads to a decrease in burglary rates by roughly two-
thirds of a standard deviation.18 Alternatively, the results shown in Table IV with respect to
larceny and motor vehicle theft reveal little e⁄ect of segregation by poverty status on these
crimes.
Finally, the most notable results are shown in the last two columns of Table IV, which
suggest that greater segregation by poverty status leads to much higher rates of the violent
interpersonal crimes of robbery and aggravated assault, with these e⁄ects being statistically
signi￿cant at the 10 percent level or higher. The point estimates indicate that a one standard
in the U.S.
17Indeed, the F-statistic on the joint signi￿cance of the instruments when using the Poverty Segregation
Index calculated without the student heavy census tracts is arguably large enough to mitigate any concerns
regarding weak instrument bias (Stock and Yogo, 2002).
18This translates to an almost 50 percent lower burglary rate (computed using the mean and standard
deviation for burglaries from Table I).
25deviation increase in the Poverty Isolation Index is associated with an increase in robbery
rates by roughly two-thirds of a standard deviation and almost nine-tenths of a standard
deviation increase in the rate of aggravated assault.19
Table V shows that the above 2SLS results are robust to other measures of segregation.
In particular, the top panel of Table V reveals the coe¢ cients on di⁄erent poverty segrega-
tion measures in otherwise analogous 2SLS speci￿cations. The top row of numbers in Table
V simply repeats the coe¢ cients on the Poverty Segregation Index shown in the top row of
Table IV. The remaining rows show the analogous coe¢ cients when using several alternative
construction methods for measures of segregation. Speci￿cation 1 uses the (standardized)
Poverty Isolation Index calculated using all census tracts (including those made up of over
60 percent college students). Speci￿cation 2 uses the (standardized) Poverty Dissimilarity
Index, which answers the question "what share of the poor population would need to change
census tracts for the poor and non-poor to be evenly distributed within a city?" and is con-







non-poortotalj for each MSA (Massey and Denton,
1988). Speci￿cation 3 uses the (standardized) Poverty Dissimilarity Index but constructed
without using those census tracts made up of over 60 percent college students. Speci￿cation
4 once again uses the (standardized) Isolation Index computed using all census tracts, but
adjusts for the overall fraction of the MSA that is poor (see Cutler and Glaeser, 1997).20
Speci￿cation 5 again uses this "adjusted" Poverty Isolation Index, but computes it exclud-
ing those census tracts made up of over 60 percent college students. One concern regarding
19Given the mean and standard deviation for robbery rates per 100 thousand residents are 133 and 85
respectively, the above estimates suggest that a one standard deviation increase in poverty segregation leads
to a roughly 40 percent higher robbery rate, all else equal. Similarly, given the mean and standard deviation
for aggravated assault rates are 321and 165 respectively, the above estimates suggest that a one standard
deviation increase in poverty segregation leads to roughly 45 percent higher aggravated assault rate, all else
equal.













p ersonstotal ) ; where persons‘ is the
number of persons in the census tract with the lowest population with in the city and i once again denotes
census tract. The ￿rst term in the top part of the above equation is the fraction poor in the census tract
occupied by the average poor individual. From this, we can subtract the percentage poor in the city as a
whole to eliminate the e⁄ect coming from the overall size of the poor population. This whole term is then
normalized to be between zero and one, with one indicating the city is the most segregated it can possibly
be.
26all of these poverty segregation measures is that they treat the poor as being distinct from
everyone else including the near poor, which obviously is not true. Therefore, Speci￿cation 6
again uses the Poverty Isolation Index calculated using all census tracts, but excludes those
individuals in each census tract whose household earnings are above the poverty line but less
than one and a half times the poverty line (the "near" poor), and Speci￿cation 7 uses the
Poverty Isolation Index that both excludes those census tracts made up of over 60 percent
students and excludes those individuals who are "near" poor. Finally, the lower panel of
Table V shows the 2SLS coe¢ cients on three di⁄erent indices of racial segregation.
As Table V shows, the coe¢ cients on the segregation index in the Burglary speci￿cations
are negative using all ten alternative indices and signi￿cantly so in nine of them with magni-
tudes both somewhat smaller and larger than the coe¢ cients that arise using the preferred
measure (i.e. top row). The coe¢ cients on the poverty segregation indices in the Larceny
and Motor Vehicle Theft speci￿cations are negative using all ten alternative measures, but
never even close to being statistically di⁄erent from zero. Finally, the coe¢ cients on the
alternative poverty segregation indices in the Robbery and Aggravated Assault speci￿ca-
tions are always positive and signi￿cantly so in eighteen of the twenty speci￿cations, with
magnitudes again both somewhat smaller and somewhat larger than those shown in the top
row of Table V.
In their paper on the consequences of ghettos, Cutler and Glaeser (1997) also use two
further instruments for (racial) segregation beyond the fraction of local government rev-
enue coming from the State or Federal governments￿ namely the number of local municipal
governments in each MSA, and the number of rivers ￿ owing through each MSA.21 I also
estimated the 2SLS speci￿cations using these variables as additional instruments for poverty
segregation. However, as the top three rows of Table IV show, using these additional in-
struments leads to no substantive di⁄erences in the estimated results, but does dramatically
21There has been considerable debate on how this variable should be property measured (see Rothstein
(2007) and Hoxby (2007)). Given it is not the focus of this analysis, I simply decided to use the number
of ￿long￿ rivers ￿ owing through each MSA as coded by Jesse Rothstein. Thanks to Jesse Rothstein for
providing me with this data.
27lower the F-statistic on the joint signi￿cance of the excluded instruments in the ￿rst stage
regression. The fact that these further instruments do not seem to add much power to the
analysis is the reason why they were not included in the "preferred" speci￿cations shown in
Table IV. Moreover, the last row of Table VI shows the coe¢ cients on the Poverty Isolation
Index variable in the ￿ve 2SLS speci￿cations using only the Cutler and Glaeser instruments
(i.e. the fraction of local revenue received from state or federal sources, the number of mu-
nicipal governments in each MSA, and the number of rivers in each MSA). These coe¢ cients
show that not using the ￿fraction of public housing given in-kind￿instrument does alter
the coe¢ cients a good deal (especially those in the larceny and motor vehicle theft speci￿-
cations), but the general conclusion remains that greater economic segregation appears to
have di⁄erential e⁄ects on violent crimes versus basic property crimes.
4.3 Discussion of Empirical Results
Clearly, the validity of the 2SLS results presented above rest on the validity of the proposed
instruments. On the most basic level, Table III (and the last column of Table V) showed
that both of the primary instruments argued to meet the exclusion restriction are indeed
signi￿cantly correlated with segregation in the predicted manner. Therefore, one criteria for
the validity of the instruments seems to be met. Moreover, given we have more excluded
instruments than potentially endogenous variables, the model is overidenti￿ed, which means
we can directly test whether it is inappropriate to exclude the instruments discussed above
from being related to crime in 2000 other than through segregation (Wooldridge, 2002).
The instruments pass this test. In particular, the p-value on the Sargan statistics for the
speci￿cations in Table IV range from 0.13 (Motor Vehicle Theft) to 0.81 (Robbery).
Another potential test of the validity of these instruments is to see if they have a sig-
ni￿cant relationship to other key metro area characteristics, such as the poverty rate or the
poverty rate for blacks, after controlling for segregation by poverty status, as well as the
other metro area characteristics. If they do, this suggests that these proposed instrumental
28variables may directly in￿ uence a variety of characteristics of a city in addition to segrega-
tion, which may then have their own direct a⁄ects on crime.22 However, running similar ￿rst
stage regressions to those shown in Table III, but using ￿percent living in poverty￿as the
dependant variable and adding the Poverty Isolation Index to the right-hand side variables,
the coe¢ cients on the two excluded instruments are small in magnitude and statistically in-
signi￿cant at any standard level of signi￿cance. Similarly, when I regress ￿percent of blacks
living in poverty￿ on the instruments, any of the segregation indices, and the remaining
right-hand side variables, the coe¢ cients on the two instruments are again small and statis-
tically insigni￿cant. In other words, other than through their relationship to segregation, the
two instruments do not appear to be related to poverty rates as a whole or poverty rates for
blacks. Moreover, when I do the analogous exercise with "percent of households headed by
single mother" as the dependant variable I again get coe¢ cients that are small in magnitude
on both instruments, but while small in magnitude, the coe¢ cient on the public housing
instrument is signi￿cantly negative at the 5% level. In other words, if anything, after con-
trolling for all of the other metro area characteristics, a higher fraction of public housing
given in-kind leads to lower rates of single parent headed households. Therefore, the above
tests are consistent (though admittedly not conclusive) with the notion that instruments are
not simply picking up the e⁄ects of some omitted variable that a⁄ects both current crimes
rates and the composition of public housing subsidies and/or the historical sources of local
revenue.
Perhaps the strongest evidence that mitigates concerns regarding the invalidity of the
proposed instruments are the di⁄erential ￿ndings across crime types in the 2SLS speci￿-
cations. In particular, if the instruments were strongly related to unmeasured variables
a⁄ecting opportunities for the poor and/or black residents, such as social services availabil-
ity and schooling, we should expect the 2SLS results to be similar across crime types, or even
more strongly positive for basic property crimes. Intuitively, if the instruments are directly
22Thanks to Francisco Martorell for suggesting this.
29related to some omitted variable measuring relative depravation or lack of opportunities for
the poor and/or blacks, such relative deprivation should impact basic property crime be-
havior in similar ways to violent crime behavior. However, the 2SLS results discussed above
contradict this, and instead reveal that these instruments appear to have a negative or neg-
ligible relationship with basic property crimes, but a strong positive relationship to violent
crimes.
Finally, it is also interesting to consider the di⁄erences in the empirical results across the
di⁄erent basic property crime categories within the context of the model. For example, the
empirical results suggested that greater economic segregation has an arguably negative im-
pact on burglary rates. In the context of the model, this suggests that an individual￿ s payo⁄
to burglary depends on the economic characteristics of his neighbors. This would be true
if burglars focused their crimes on the other residents of their neighborhoods. This seems
plausible, as a person would generally only break and enter a residence or commercial estab-
lishment if he had knowledge of something valuable to steal. Clearly, such information would
be better locally than more distantly. On the other hand, the empirical results suggested
that greater segregation had no impact on larceny and motor vehicle theft. In the context of
the model this would suggest an individual￿ s payo⁄ to these crimes does not depend on the
economic characteristics of his neighbors. Given larceny and motor vehicle theft generally
involve taking readily observable items, perpetrators of such crimes can easily travel to other
neighborhoods to commit such crimes, suggesting it to be reasonable that the payo⁄to such
crimes has little relationship to his own neighbor￿ s characteristics.
5 Conclusion
The model developed in this paper showed that a very standard behavioral assumption,
namely that individuals incur diminishing marginal utility of money, can have substantial
implications when it comes to criminal participation. In particular, the model not only
30showed how such an assumption can cause poverty to a⁄ect an individual￿ s likelihood of
engaging in all types of crime, but also tha ￿neighborhood e⁄ects￿can actually arise under
very minimal additional assumptions, particularly when it comes to violent crime.
Importantly, the model also showed that the diminishing marginal utility of money as-
sumption will mean that this neighborhood e⁄ect will be stronger for poor individuals than
non-poor individuals, or in other words, that violent criminal behavior of poor individuals
may be more in￿ uenced by neighborhood economic characteristics than is the violent crim-
inal behavior of non-poor individuals. This in turn was shown to imply that while greater
economic segregation might have no e⁄ect or potentially even a negative e⁄ect on the overall
amount of basic property crime, it may be expected to lead to a higher level of violence than
would occur if the poor were more evenly dispersed throughout the city.
While this implication was shown to be consistent with several empirical ￿ndings, cer-
tainly more evidence is necessary to de￿nitively conclude that this model provides an im-
portant component regarding the connections between crime and poverty. However, if true,
this theoretical model leads to a very important conclusion. Namely, that when it comes to
violent crime, not only do an individual￿ s own economic characteristics matter, but so do
the economic characteristics of his neighbors. Therefore, while it is clear that policies dic-
tating how public housing is allocated and how an urban area is developed will a⁄ect who is
victimized by crime, such policies may also have a signi￿cant impact on who commits crime
and the overall amount of crime that occurs. Moreover, the results of this paper suggest
that demolition and decreased use of large housing projects over the last decade may be an
important component in declining rates of violence over the last decade.
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Figure 1 – Graphical depiction showing that δt(ωℓ) > δp(ωℓ) > δt(ωh) > δp(ωh)  will be true 








 Table I - Descriptive Statistics of Data
Variable Mean Std. Dev.
Crime 
Basic Property Crimes (in 2000)
  burglaries per 100K residents 836 323
  larcenies per 100K residents 2903 944
  motor vehicle thefts per 100K residents 388 210
Interpersonal Crimes (in 2000)
  robberies per 100K residents 133 85
  aggravated assaults per 100K residents 321 165
law enforcement officers per 1000 residents 244 150
MSA Characteristics
  total population 893,239 1,298,606
  percent poor 12.3 4.5
  percent urban 82.0 11.1
  percent immigrant 1.2 0.9
  percent black 11.0 9.9
  percent hispanic 11.5 15.8
  percent of adults with college degree 23.9 6.8
  percent of households headed by single mother 7.5 1.6
  percent of households receiveing housing assistance 2.1 1.0
  unemployment rate 5.9 1.9
  percent of days over 100 degrees 11.1 8.0
  percent of days below 32 degrees 22.2 13.4
Segregation
  Isolation Index of Segregation by Poverty Status 0.20 0.06
  Isolation Index of Segregation by Poverty Status 0.19 0.05
    (excluding tracts with over 60% of population in college)
  Isolation Index of Segregation by Race 0.33 0.07
Number of observations 228  
 Table II - OLS Regession Results
standardized standardized
standardized standardized motor vehicle standardized aggravated
Variable burglary rate larceny rate theft rate robbery rate assault rate
std. poverty isolation index 0.078 0.075 0.240 0.346 0.213
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.125) (0.137) (0.123)* (0.106)*** (0.129)
Officers per 1000 residents 1999 0.109 0.055 0.014 0.107 0.098
(0.037)*** (0.040) (0.036) (0.031)*** (0.038)***
percent in poverty 0.052 0.063 -0.027 -0.059 -0.005
(0.039) (0.043) (0.038) (0.033)* (0.040)
log of population -0.131 -0.252 0.373 0.310 0.162
(0.074)* (0.081)*** (0.073)*** (0.063)*** (0.076)**
percent urban 0.017 0.018 0.027 0.018 0.003
(0.007)** (0.008)** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)
percent immigrant -0.072 -0.053 -0.096 -0.023 -0.023
(0.064) (0.070) (0.063) (0.054) (0.066)
percent black 0.009 -0.014 -0.001 0.039 -0.010
(0.012) (0.013) (0.011) (0.010)*** (0.012)
percent hispanic -0.015 -0.013 -0.015 0.001 -0.004
(0.007)** (0.007)* (0.006)** (0.006) (0.007)
percent with college degree -0.025 0.005 -0.011 -0.018 -0.016
(0.010)*** (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)** (0.010)
percent of HH with single mother 0.088 0.213 0.171 -0.007 0.110
(0.064) (0.070)*** (0.063)*** (0.054) (0.066)*
percent of HH subsidized -0.120 -0.010 -0.105 0.036 -0.078
(0.061)* (0.067) (0.060)* (0.052) (0.063)
percent unemployed -0.029 -0.124 0.066 0.012 -0.011
(0.054) (0.059)** (0.053) (0.046) (0.056)
percent of days above 90 deg. 0.100 0.114 0.066 0.070 0.118
(0.032)*** (0.034)*** (0.031)** (0.027)*** (0.032)***
sq. of percent of days above 90 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003
(0.001)** (0.001)* (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
percent of days below 32 deg. 0.025 0.059 0.019 0.029 -0.049
(0.017) (0.019)*** (0.017) (0.014)** (0.017)***
sq. of percent of days below 32 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)**
N 228 228 228 228 228
R - square 0.40 0.38 0.51 0.63 0.38
Dependant Variable
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   
 Table III - First Stage of 2SLS Regession Results
std. poverty
isolation index
std. poverty (excluding census tracts
Control Variables isolation index with over 60% in college)
INSTRUMENTS MEETING EXCLUSION RESTRICTION
  percent of housing assistance via public housing 0.003 0.004
(0.002)** (0.001)***
  percent of local rev. coming from State & Fed gov't. -0.009 -0.010
(0.003)*** (0.003)***
NON-EXCLUDED
  officers per 1000 residents 1999 -0.012 0.009
(0.000) (0.000)
  percent in poverty 0.245 0.213
(0.016)*** (0.014)***
  log of population 0.037 0.122
(0.042) (0.038)***
  percent urban 0.012 0.010
(0.004)*** (0.004)**
  percent immigrant -0.077 -0.077
(0.037)** (0.034)**
  percent black 0.023 0.021
(0.007)*** (0.006)***
  percent hispanic -0.006 -0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
  percent with college degree 0.027 0.001
(0.006)*** (0.005)
  percent of HH with single mother -0.008 0.060
(0.037) (0.034)*
  percent of households subsidized -0.113 -0.068
(0.035)*** (0.032)**
  unemployment rate -0.043 -0.031
(0.031) (0.028)
  percent of days above 90 deg. -0.050 -0.038
(0.018)*** (0.016)**
  sq. of percent of days above 90 0.001 0.001
(0.001)** (0.001)**
  percent of days below 32 deg. 0.012 0.011
(0.010) (0.009)
  sq. of percent of days below 32 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
  constant -4.304 -5.073
(0.605)*** (0.552)***
N 228 228
R - square 0.82 0.86
F-stat for excluded instruments 6.72** 10.69***
Dependant Variable
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   Table IV - 2SLS Regession Results
standardized standardized
standardized standardized motor vehicle standardized aggravated
Variable burglary rate larceny rate theft rate robbery rate assault rate
std. poverty isolation index -0.672    -0.053 0.002 0.643 0.886
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.429) (0.434) (0.394) (0.343)* (0.433)**
officers per 1000 residents in 1999 0.132 0.059 0.022 0.100 0.077
(0.040)*** (0.041) (0.037) (0.032)*** (0.041)*
percent in poverty 0.220 0.092 0.026 -0.126 -0.156
(0.100)** (0.101) (0.092) (0.080) (0.101)
log of population -0.029 -0.235 0.405 0.270 0.071
(0.095) (0.096)** (0.087)*** (0.076)*** (0.096)
percent urban 0.027 0.020 0.030 0.015 -0.006
(0.009)*** (0.009)** (0.009)*** (0.007)** (0.009)
percent immigrant -0.109 -0.059 -0.108 -0.008 0.010
(0.070) (0.070) (0.064)* (0.056) (0.070)
percent black 0.026 -0.011 0.004 0.032 -0.025
(0.015)* (0.015) (0.014) (0.012)*** (0.015)*
percent hispanic -0.016 -0.013 -0.016 0.001 -0.003
(0.007)** (0.007)* (0.006)** (0.005) (0.007)
percent with college degree -0.030 0.004 -0.012 -0.016 -0.012
(0.010)*** (0.011) (0.010) (0.008)** (0.011)
percent of HH with single mother 0.114 0.217 0.179 -0.017 0.087
(0.068)* (0.069)*** (0.063)*** (0.055) (0.069)
percent of HH subsidized -0.175 -0.020 -0.122 0.058 -0.029
(0.070)** (0.071) (0.065)* (0.056) (0.071)
unemployment rate -0.060 -0.129 0.056 0.024 0.017
(0.059) (0.059)** (0.054) (0.047) (0.059)
percent of days above 90 deg. 0.063 0.107 0.054 0.084 0.151
(0.038)* (0.039)*** (0.035) (0.031)*** (0.039)***
sq. of percent of days above 90 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)*** (0.001)***
percent of days below 32 deg. 0.035 0.060 0.022 0.025 -0.058
(0.018)* (0.019)*** (0.017) (0.015)* (0.019)***
sq. of percent of days below 32 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.001
(0.000)* (0.000)** (0.000) (0.000)* (0.000)***
constant -4.961 -1.917 -9.484 -4.093 0.979
(2.549)* (2.576) (2.338)*** (2.036)** (2.573)
N 228 228 228 228 228
F-stat on excl. instruments 10.69*** 10.69*** 10.69*** 10.69*** 10.69***
p-val on Sargan Stat. 0.23 0.39 0.13 0.81 0.20
Dependant Variable
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.   Table V - 2SLS Regession Coefficients on Alternative Segregation Indices
standardized standardized
standardized standardized  motor  vehicle standardized aggravated F-stat
Measure of Segregation burglary rate larceny rate theft rate robbery rate assault rate on instr.
std. poverty isolation index -0.672    -0.053 0.002 0.643 0.886 10.69***
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.429) (0.434) (0.394) (0.343)* (0.433)**
Alternative Poverty Segregation Indices
1 - std. poverty isolation index -0.840 -0.185 -0.082 0.746 0.936 6.72**
  (using all census tracts) (0.503)* (0.502) (0.455) (0.419)* (0.527)*
2 - std. poverty dissimilarity index -0.541 -0.216 -0.122 0.433 0.461 8.18***
  (using all census tracts) (0.302)* (0.302) (0.271) (0.241)* (0.297)
3 - std. poverty dissimilarity index -0.509 -0.193 -0.107 0.413 0.449 9.11***
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.287)* (0.286) (0.258) (0.225)* (0.279)
4 - std. "adjusted" poverty isolation index -0.501 -0.121 -0.057 0.439 0.542 7.00***
  (using all census tracts) (0.295)* (0.296) (0.268) (0.246)* (0.309)*
5 - std. "adjusted" poverty isolation index -0.356 -0.054 -0.017 0.328 0.432 12.20***
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.216)* (0.220) (0.200) (0.173)* (0.217)**
6 - std. poverty isolation index -0.917 -0.244 -0.119 0.794 0.960 5.99**
  (using all census tracts but excluding (0.545)* (0.537) (0.485) (0.452)* (0.564)*
  the "near" poor)
7 - std. poverty isolation index -0.758 -0.105 -0.030 0.703 0.933 8.99***
  (excluding census tracts with over 60% in (0.475) (0.473) (0.429) (0.378)* (0.476)**
   college and the "near" poor)
Racial Segregation Indices
8 - std. racial isolation index -0.628 -0.147 -0.067 0.554 0.687 12.93***
  (using all census tracts) (0.368)* (0.373) (0.337) (0.290)* (0.342)**
9 - std. "adjusted" racial isolation index -0.468 -0.111 -0.051 0.412 0.511 12.52***
  (using all census tracts) (0.273)* (0.277) (0.251) (0.215)* (0.257)**
10 - std. racial dissimilarity index -0.380 -0.108 -0.055 0.325 0.387 15.24***
  (using all census tracts) (0.209)* (0.218) (0.198) (0.174)* (0.214)*
Dependant Variable
 
 Table VI - 2SLS Regession Coefficients on Segregation Index Using Additional Instruments
standardized standardized
standardized  standardized motor  vehicle standardized aggravated F-stat
burglary rate larceny rate theft rate robbery rate assault rate on instr.
Instruments: (i) Fraction Public Housing 
   given 'in-kind', (ii) Fraction of Local
  Public Revenue Received from St. or Fed.
   std. poverty isolation index -0.672    -0.053 0.002 0.643 0.886 10.69***
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.429) (0.434) (0.394) (0.343)* (0.433)**
Instruments: (i) Fraction Public Housing 
   given 'in-kind', (ii) Fraction of Local
  Public Revenue Received from St. or Fed.,
  (iii) Number of municipalities in MSA
   std. poverty isolation index -0.667 -0.050 -0.011 0.639 0.884 7.09***
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.429) (0.434) (0.394) (0.343)* (0.433)**
Instruments: (i) Fraction Public Housing 
   given 'in-kind', (ii) Fraction of Local
  Public Revenue Received from St. or Fed.,
  (iii) Number of municipalities in MSA,
  (iv) Number of 'long' Rivers in MSA
   std. poverty isolation index -0.608 0.205 0.180 0.663 0.991 5.11***
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.429) (0.424) (0.387) (0.346)* (0.439)**
Instruments: (i)  Fraction of Local
  Public Revenue Received from St. or Fed.,
  (iii) Number of municipalities in MSA,
  (iv) Number of Rivers in MSA
   std. poverty isolation index -1.073 -0.602 -0.410 0.671 0.423 3.64**
  (excluding tracts with over 60% in college) (0.638)* (0.605) (0.555) (0.464) (0.546)
Dependant Variable
 